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REVIEWS

Harlan B. Miller and William H. Williams, eds.,
Ethics and Animals (CI if
ifton
ton , New Jersey:
The Humana Press, 1983). pp. 400 + xii.
Ethics and
Animals collects
27
essays which were originally presented
at a 1979 conference held at Virginia
Tech.
It featut~es important articles
by well-known thinkers who set out
broadly dr~awn rationales or critiques
of "animal liberation" positions.
It
also contains some interesting, more
finely foctjsed analyses of particular
concepts and claims that are involved
in animal ethics discussions.
A par
ticularly interesting feature of the
text is the contribution of nonphiloso
phers:
there are interesting studies
of ape language research, stress lev
els encountered by chickens in inten
sive rearing, an account of the legal
handling of a literal case of animal
liberation-the freeing of two captive
dolphins from an Hawaiian research
institute-and a vademecum for animal
rights activists.

An nette c. Baier's "Fi ndi ng Ou r
Pla,ce in the An imal World" is a pa rtic
ularly valuable instance of the first
class of contributions to the book.
It
comments usefully on an earlier essay,
Jan Narveson's "Animal Rights Revi
sited" (this sort of cross reference
happens often in the text, and is one
of its happiest features).
Narveson's
paper sketches the three moral theo
ries he regards as most interest
ing-libertarianism, utilitarianism, and
cont racta ria n ism-a nd
concl udes
that
only util ita rian ism provides any sup
port for the kinds of claims animal
·Iiberationists typically make, and that
even that support is much weaker and
more equivocal than many believe.
Now, the problem of determining just
what implications utilitarianism has for
our treatment of animals is much

discussed;
see,
for example,
the
exchange between Peter Singer and
Tom Regan in Philosophy & Public
Affairs for 1980, and R. G. Frey's
I~ecent Rights,. Killing and Suffering.
But Baier's focus is on what must
sur~ely be a fairly common response to
Narveson's claim that the other~ theo
r~ies-libertarianism and
contractarian
ism-leave animals out in the cold.
Such a result will seem to many (at
least in some moods) to be profoundly
cou nteri ntu itive.
If such
theories
al~en't refuted by their neglect of ani
mais, they must be at least profoundly
emba rrassed.
Baier notes that, along with what
might be called "pro-animal" intui
tions, there are certainly "anti-animal"
i ntu ition s as well, ones that a re not at
all disturbed by the massive exploita
tion of animals. The question is, how
should we sort out which set of intui
tions are suitable for assessing con
tending moral theories?
Her article ta kes the view that
"pro-animal" intuitions are less likely
to be tainted by special interest and
dogmatism than are their anti-animal
competitors,
and that there is a
theory, one unconsidered by Narve
son, wh ich nicely accommodates these
intuitions. The remainder of the arti
cle explores what might be the payoff
for animals of such a view, a Humean
style virtue ethics.
Discussions of vi rtue ethics have
b'een prominent lately-at least since
Alasdair
Macintyre's After Virtue.
But the few attempts I have seen to
apply such approaches to questions of
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animal ethics have been disappoint
ingly obscure.
Baief~'s clear account
of the boundaries of such an orienta
tion is thus all the more valuable.
I
have often found something implausible
in attempts to downplay the signifi
cance of virtues such as "kindness in
considef'ing the casuistry of human
animal relations; Tom Regan's oft-made
claim (occur'ring in "Animal Rights,
Human Wrongs," his contribution to
this volume) that it is not enough to
encourage
kindness
to
animals,
because such a vi rtue is a matter of
motivation
and
understanding,
not
action, has always seemed a bit too
"quick for me.
An animal researcher
exploring, say, the nature of pain by
harming unanaesthetized animals might
be a kind person, but could such a
person be at all plausibly descf'ibed as
being kind to animals?
Perhaps so,
but the idea cou Id stand more exami
nation than it's gotten.
Given the
extent of intuitions Pf'oscf~ibing cru
elty and pr'escribing kindness to ani
mals, the pr'actical implications could
well be considerable.
It is that sort
of work that
Baier's piece might
encou rage.
Recent discussions of animal ethics
have contribututed to issues of gen
eral moral import as well.
One of
these concer'ns the criteria necessary
for a being to have a right to life.
Edward Johnson's "Life, Death and
Animals" defends the view that the
mere possession of simple conscious
ness is sufficient to confer a right to
life (if anything is), because none of
the attempts
to isolate a morally
nonarbitrary
"line
of
demarcation"
between
simple
consciousness
and
r'eflexive consciousness work.
Dale
jamieson's "Killing Persons and Other
Beings" argues that the possession of
simple consciousness gives its subject
a prima facie right to life, since con
sciousness itself is good.

the

Like Baier, jamieson comments on
wOf'k of his co-symposiasts.
He
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finds johnson's contribution correct in
conclusion but murky in argument.
The difficulty seems to be that, while
johnson may have successfully shown
that
even
non reflex ively
conscious
animals may well have a "derived
interest" in life, there is no argument
showing that we ought to respect that
derived interest.
Simply having an
interest in something,
as jamieson
quite reasonably points out, is not
enough to entitle one to that thing.
But this critique seems to mistake the
direction of johnson's paper.
As I
read him, he is not so much s howi ng
that animals possessing simple con
sciousness do have a right to life;
rather, he is undermining our confi
dence in our ability to point to the
reason why animals fail to have the
kind of right to life that we enjoy.
jam i eson 's own a rg u ment seems to en d
up having the same sort of problem he
accuses johnson of suffering from-that
is, the lack of a satisfactory accou nt
of why the ha rm that death is sup
posed to be to a creatu re of simple
consciousness is morally significant.
jamieson argues that consciousness is
something that we prefer indepen
dently of its contents. Accepti ng th is
view explains our tendencies to disap
prove of euthanasia for the slightly
unhappy, and to approve of being
awake and somewhat depressed as
opposed to being simply unconscious.
But, unless Jamieson is willing to
countenance unfelt pr'eferences, it is
difficult to see the import of this for
the simply conscious.
For it woul"d
seem ex hypothesi that they entertain
no preference for consciousness, since
consciousness
is not something of
which they are aware.
I suppose one
might counter this by saying that
consciousness is not good because it
is preferred; rather, it is preferred
because it is good.
If that's so, then
the moral theory operating here is not
p reference uti I ita ria n i sm, but rather a
direct intrinsic good consequentialism.
But the a rticle does not show why
consciousness is intrinsically good for
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. one who is unaware of it; rather, it
argues that since we complexly con
conscious beings prefer consciousness to
nonconsciousness, it is good for sim
simple beings to be conscious rather than
nonconscious.
This
doesn't
seem
obviously true, anyway.
One might
perhaps regard their
simple consciousness as a derived good, given
its relation to things that animals
actually experience as good, but then
we are back with Jamieson's criticism
of his reading of Johnson: why should
we worry about such derived goods?

Ethics and Animals contains several essays by nonphilosophers.
My
general view of these efforts is that
when they address topics that are
eth ically relevant but do not actually
make arguments about ethical issues
or ethical
methodology,
they are
extremely
useful
and
interesting.
When, on the other hand, they engage
in
philosophy,
they
are
uneven.
Michael W. Fox's "Ph i losophy, Ecol
Ecology, Animal Welfare, and the 'Rights'
Question" is another of a series of
announcements which one hears rather
often today, to the effect that the
way philosophers tend to go about
th i ngs is
just
a Itogether
wrong-

headed.
Now, this may well be tt·ue.
But the difficulty is that no one, to
my knowledge-certainly not Fox-has
shown that it is true, much less gone
on to show how things ought to be
handled.
Part of the problem here,
of cout·se, may be that the typical
philosopher's standards of what con
constitutes "showing that something is
so" at·e part of the problem. My own
hope is that as the received methodol
methodologies continue to be challenged-as,
for example, feminist philosophy con
conti n ues to matu re-they may bri ng us to
a better sense of the ovet·all sound
soundness of ou r typical goals and methods,
This is a huge job, but I can't see
that anything in Fox's article gets us
any forwarder on it.
But these last comments are not
intended to deprecate the importance
of nonphilosophical contributions to
our understanding of our duties to
animals. The task of applying ethics
is inherently an integrative one; you
need to have you r facts straight as
badly as you need clear concepts and
defensible values. Ethics and Animals
performs an important service by col
collecting such valuable contributions to
all these areas.
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